The Meaning of Life

Scott Biss
The University of the South, 1999

Philosophy asks of anyone that would answer: "What is the meaning of life?"  In the attempt to answer this question, one must contend with the questions of reason, instinct, morality, and the existence of God.  I answer the question with my own philosophy, in which I define reason as a faculty that serves either to moderate or work toward the realization of my instinctual desires and needs.  I also place bounds on the powers of both reason and instinct; they are limited within the borders of the natural world.  I regard the question of the existence of God with justifiable indecision. The crux of my personal philosophy is to balance reason and instinct, using those two faculties to define morality to the best of my ability.

In explaining my philosophy, I shall first argue my position on the relationship between human reason and human instinct in life.  Reason itself is an important human faculty.  It allows us to pursue such disciplines as scientific discovery and philosophical thought.  However, reason is not an all-powerful faculty; it cannot, by itself, provide all knowledge required to live a good life.  Only when used with human natural instinct can reason be of benefit in life.  Instinct provides human beings with their most basic and fundamental drives and desires.  It is human instinct that compels people to eat, seek shelter, and reproduce.  One might say that reason also dictates the fulfillment of these goals; however, in the absence of reason these goals would still exist.  Instinct underlies reason and is the fundamental basis for human existence. 

Reason, therefore, plays an important role by working with instinct, not at a level above or below it.  The rational faculty serves to moderate or further the goals and desires of our natural instincts, as appropriate.  In some instances, one's instincts would lead him or her into a situation that is desirable.  For example, extreme hunger would prompt one's instincts to eat a large amount of food.  However, reason can serve in this situation to limit the amount of food one eats and therefore avoid the later pain of a stomachache.  More generally, reason can deny the satisfaction of immediate instinctual desires in order to gain a greater, long-term good.  Conversely, an instinctual need or desire might be better fulfilled by the intercession of reason.  Ancient peoples, feeling the frequent instinctual desire to eat, used reason to develop agricultural techniques in order to better feed themselves.  A human being's natural instincts and rational faculties are closely and inseparably tied together.

Humans are corporeal beings; one possesses a physical body with its own instinctual desires, needs, and reactions.  The physical body also contains one's mind, or one's reason.  It is impossible and undesirable to detach reason from one's corporeal self; to attempt to do so would separate it from our everyday life.  A permanently disembodied mind serves no purpose in actual life; it is reduced to a mere abstraction of human existence.  In other words, a rational ghost is of no value to itself.

This idea contrasts Descartes' vision of autonomous reason as a means of living.  He argues that only pure and unencumbered  reason can make sense of human existence. Our instincts and senses are capable of deception, Descartes argues; one should not trust them.  One should adopt a temporary central skepticism in order to clear the mind of prejudices and biases. From this new, objective standpoint, one should use reason to define absolutely certain axioms upon which further knowledge can be built.  Only an initial rational skepticism -- including skepticism of the existence of all things outside one's own mind -- can attain this unbiased state and build upward from it.  Complete rationality, Descartes argues, is required to obtain certain knowledge.

I argue that Decartes' idea of autonomous reason is not attainable. As the philosopher David Hume demonstrates, reason has definite.  Hume points out that in common life as well as in natural science, reason is founded upon something more fundamental: the assumption that the future will resemble the past.  Reason, which relies on concrete facts, can make predictions about the future but cannot do so with absolute rational certainty.  An example of this is the assumption that if I were to exert a forward force on a box, then the box would move forward.  Though the box may have behaved in this way in all previous circumstances, I cannot rationally conclude that it must  do so in the future because such a future occurrence has yet to happen.  There is no concrete, indisputable evidence that my exerted forward force will cause the box to move forward.  However, natural science assumes this to be true, and rightly so.  This principle is founded on a certain natural faith, as Hume names it, that the future will resemble the past.  One's natural faith is grounded in a non-rational instinct inherent in all human beings. For example, it would be irrational to believe that the box will not move, but the belief is not grounded in rationality. Natural faith allows humans to use  their rational powers. This disables Descartes' argument for autonomous reason because natural faith (as a function of natural instinct) is required to believe in the future validity of Descartes' rational axioms.  For example, "I think, therefore I am" (Descartes, Discourse, section 32), is a rationally valid statement.  However, "I think, therefore I will be in the future," is not rationally valid because a natural faith is required to expect the statement's truth.  Reason can never fully replace instinct as the fundamental basis for life; therefore, reason, as a limited faculty, is incapable of answering ultimate questions alone.

The balance of natural instinct and human reason is a large basis for my philosophy of life; a life that is lived, like David Hume's ideal, as a common life.  This balance is crucial in that it lends itself to a life that neither abstracts itself by complete adherence to reason nor debases itself by the unrestrained pursuit of instinctual goals by denial of reason.

However, by "common" I do not imply that my life need be a boring, monotonous, or in any way unextraordinary life.  "Common" means that I can live as a complete human being, lacking no part of myself.  Having obtained the optimum balance between instinct and reason for myself, then, what of other limits or restrictions on my actions?  I must address the question of morality, for any moral obligations deeply affect how I go about living my life.

The idea of morality is often connected with the idea of God, and rightly so.  If God exists (as presented in common ethical monotheistic religions), then God would be capable of imposing a universal moral code upon humankind.  Therefore, to reach any conclusion on morality, the enigma of the existence of God should be addressed.

One might attempt to prove the existence of God through rational means.  However, reason is a tool, one that is limited to the natural world and bound to natural instincts. Reason has no understanding of ideas or things that exist beyond the natural world.  The concepts of God and the afterlife are beyond the natural world and therefore beyond the comprehension of a human being's rational faculties.  Any conception of an afterlife, or heaven, or supreme being must be defined in terms of the natural world.  For example, one might picture heaven as being made of gold and gems; however, gold and gems are elements of the natural world.  To define God as infinite in power or understanding attaches an incomprehensible term to the idea of God: infinity cannot be truly understood by humans because human reason is finite.  One cannot use reason to form a clear or distinct idea of God because reason is limited to nature.  God and the afterlife are supernatural  ideas. 

Reason, therefore, is incapable of either proving or disproving the existence of God.  Our natural instincts are similarly helpless to accomplish this feat because they are, like reason, bound to the natural world.  Our natural faith lends no judgement on this matter because God is a supernatural being.  Since both reason and instinctual natural faith are inseparably connected to the natural world, one would require a supernatural faith in order to believe in such a supernatural God. 

Where would a supernatural faith come from?  Just as natural faith is provided by natural instincts, supernatural faith would have to be provided by a supernatural instinct.  This supernatural instinct is the only means by which humans themselves could gain faith to believe in God.  This kind of instinct could account for many people's claims of a "spiritual vacuum that needs to be filled with God" or "an innate longing for God," as well as those that claim to "just know."  Some claim that faith in God can only be a gift from God.  This gift would serve the same function as the supernatural instinct -- providing supernatural faith -- or be the awakening or installation of such an instinct.

If a supernatural instinct is required to have supernatural faith, then the question arises as to whether or not humans possess this instinct.  Certainly many people claim to have faith in God, implying the real existence of such an instinct.  However, the only person upon whom I can base any conclusion in this matter is myself.  I have no knowledge of or access to the spirituality of any other person; I cannot place certain trust in the reports of others.  I can only examine myself.  Throughout the course of my life, I cannot recall having felt a discernable supernatural need or desire.  Therefore, I am led to believe that I have never felt the effects of a supernatural instinct.  This fact implies the instinct's absence.

However, this does not mean that such an instinct does not or cannot exist.  The past absence of the supernatural instinct does not imply its future absence.   Its super-nature places it beyond the natural faith that the future will resemble the past.  Therefore, supernatural faith could  exist and be valid.  God and the afterlife, too, could exist even though I cannot currently identify any supernatural instinct within myself.

Since I do not feel an instinct that creates supernatural faith, but also recognize that this does not exclude the possibility of such faith, I must suspend judgement on the matter of God's existence.  I am unequipped to make a decision, but realize that this present state does not necessarily imply that I will always be a skeptic on this matter.  Should I experience a supernatural instinctual pull toward faith, I will recognize it as I would a natural instinct.  Since supernatural instinct can never suggest its own nonexistence, my only alternative, should it never manifest itself, is to remain ever a skeptic about God and the supernatural.

On this point I differ from David Hume's philosophy of common life.  He suggests that one can never believe in a Christian God because miracles, the best proof of such a God's existence, should at best be regarded with a suspension of judgement.  The evidence for the occurrence of a miracle can never exceed the evidence against it.  By continuously suspending judgement, he would remain ever a skeptic and therefore never believe in a Christian God. 

I, however, not only admit the possibility of the Christian God's existence but also realize that I may at some point to be able to believe it through a faith brought by the manifestation of a supernatural instinct. 

Someone might attempt to refute my argument for supernatural skepticism using the philosophy of Blaise Pascal.  Pascal demonstrates that human nature is dual in that human beings exhibit an equal capacity for acts of greatness and acts of wretchedness.  This duality thwarts any attempt to make sense of life and live it to fulfillment.  Humans must recognize their duality -- their conflicting nature of godliness and a state fallen from God -- in order to make sense of life.  Humans must then turn to Jesus Christ in order to remedy that duality by achieving a balance in order to live a happy and fulfilling life.

I would refute Pascal's argument by stating that Pascal's diagnosis of the human condition is flawed unless one already has a belief in the Christian God.  One must believe in Pascal's God in order to assume the universal morality required to assign the labels "great" and "wretched" to the human condition.  The word "great" has a typically ambiguous but here obviously moral meaning, while the word "wretched" is meaningless without making certain moral assumptions.

As a supernatural skeptic and one who cannot now believe in Christianity, I cannot place a definite belief in Christian universal morality and therefore can recognize no such greatness/wretchedness duality within myself.  I must suspend judgement on belief in this dual moral state because of its necessary tie to a universal morality based in Christianity.

The question of morality within my own life still must be addressed.  I have demonstrated that I must suspend judgement on the issue of universal morality.  This does not, however, mean that I have no morality.  To define my morality I must use a different method than religious means.  Since no supernatural instinct is now apparent within me, I must use my natural instinct, aided by reason, to define my morality. 

Natural instinct desires what is generally (or at least by short-term evaluation) beneficial to life.  Reason can either further the pursuit of these goals or moderate them for the greater good of life in long-term vision.  By basing my morality upon these two faculties, I arrive at the conclusion that morality for me must be based upon that which is for the good of life.  In most circumstances, I instinctually know what is good or beneficial for life and what is bad or detrimental.  Unclear or nearsighted ideas about a moral situation can be resolved by the use of reason.  In this way, balance in life is brought to morality as well.

By regarding reason and natural instinct as existing in a balance with each other in which reason furthers or moderates the pulls of instinct, I can achieve a balanced life.  Reason and natural instinct are fully bound to the natural world, which leads to the conclusion that a supernatural instinct is required to have supernatural faith in the existence of God and universal or divinely-ordained morality.  In the absence of this supernatural instinct, I suspend judgement on the issue of the existence of God, basing my morality on the instinctual and rational faculties available to me.  The philosophy of my life is fairly simple and balanced.  However, the challenge lies in living; life never presents itself simply, and moral decisions are sometimes as difficult to make as a moral code is to follow.  I, like anyone, can at best strive to live my life as well as possible.